RFID UID cloning bypasses NCL ship door locks
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Norwegian Cruise Line door access readers accept cloned RFID UIDs, letting anyone with brief proximity to a keycard forge a working duplicate.
CERT/CC published VU#676317 describing an improper authentication vulnerability (CVE-2026-75907) in RFID-based door access controllers used aboard Norwegian Cruise Line ships. The readers authenticate NFC keycards solely by checking the card's static 7-byte UID rather than performing any cryptographic challenge-response. Because a UID is not secret and the NTAG212 tags used do not require validation of their signed serial-number block during access checks, the system provides identification only, not real authentication.
An attacker who briefly gets within a few centimeters of a legitimate keycard (e.g., 1-2 inches for 13.56 MHz cards) can capture its UID with an inexpensive RFID reader/writer without touching or altering the original card, then write that UID to a blank UID-writable card to produce a permanent, fully functional duplicate credential. Depending on logging configuration, such unauthorized entries may be indistinguishable from legitimate access, which is particularly concerning given that these controllers guard restricted areas on a passenger vessel with direct safety implications.
CERT/CC was unable to identify or coordinate with the vendor, so no patch exists. Mitigations are limited to physical countermeasures: RFID-blocking wallets/sleeves, DIY foil shielding, and maintaining physical distance from unknown readers/devices. There is no indication of in-the-wild exploitation; this is a disclosed design weakness rather than an observed attack campaign. Defenders operating similar UID-only RFID access control systems, particularly in maritime, hospitality, or facility contexts, should treat this as a reminder to move toward cryptographically authenticated credentials (e.g., DESFire EV or similar systems supporting challenge-response) rather than relying on static UID matching.
Mentioned in this report
Source reporting: https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/676317
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