# NCSC-NCA report details ransomware ecosystem evolution

Published: 2023-09-11 · Severity: routine · Sectors: healthcare, energy, government-national, infrastructure, financial-services, manufacturing, transportation
Canonical: https://vorant.io/reports/e88480cb-bbe6-5ed8-bc6c-229a9e86d853/ncsc-nca-report-details-ransomware-ecosystem-evolution

> NCSC and NCA analysis shows organized crime groups professionalizing ransomware-as-a-service operations with lower barriers to entry.

The UK's NCSC and NCA have published joint analysis of how organized criminal groups have evolved their ransomware and extortion operations since 2017, particularly through the growth of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) models. The report describes a complex criminal ecosystem where less technically skilled actors can launch attacks using pre-developed tools, supported by supply chains offering services like custom ransomware portals, victim negotiation platforms, and data leak sites. Criminal groups increasingly operate with business-like structures including salaries and benefits.

The analysis reveals that most attack victims are chosen opportunistically rather than through targeted campaigns, with criminals adapting tactics based on sector likelihood to pay—ransomware to disrupt logistics companies dependent on system access, extortion-only against healthcare providers where patient privacy is the leverage point. Despite improved organizational defenses since 2018, criminal success remains driven primarily by exploiting poor cyber hygiene rather than sophisticated techniques.

The NCSC emphasizes ransomware as one of the UK's most acute cyber threats and urges all organizations to implement ransomware guidance, register for the free Early Warning service for network monitoring, and strengthen defenses through basic cyber hygiene practices.

## Detection guidance (public sample)

### Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic

ATT&CK: T1486

Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies with vssadmin or wmic, a common step before ransomware encrypts data so victims cannot recover from local snapshots. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin or wmic. Ransomware
  operators commonly do this immediately before encryption to prevent recovery. The
  source report is high-level, so this rule covers the generic pre-encryption behaviour
  associated with T1486 and not any campaign-specific artefact.
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1486
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: \vssadmin.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - delete
    - shadows
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: \wmic.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - shadowcopy
    - delete
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Backup or storage maintenance scripts that purge old shadow copies to reclaim disk
  space
- Administrators manually clearing snapshots during disk troubleshooting
level: high
id: 44cde85f-a873-589d-bf4f-ed80fab8a1d8
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/experts-reveal-insights-cyber-crime-ecosystem
```

### Backup Catalog Deletion or Boot Recovery Disabled

ATT&CK: T1486

Detects wbadmin backup deletion or bcdedit changes that disable Windows recovery, a pre-encryption step commonly seen in ransomware intrusions. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: Backup Catalog Deletion or Boot Recovery Disabled
description: Detects wbadmin deleting backup catalogs or system state backups, and
  bcdedit disabling recovery or ignoring boot failures. Both are typical ransomware
  preparation steps that inhibit recovery before data is encrypted for impact.
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1486
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_wbadmin:
    Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - delete
    - catalog
  selection_wbadmin_systemstate:
    Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - delete
    - systemstatebackup
  selection_bcdedit_recovery:
    Image|endswith: \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - recoveryenabled
    - 'no'
  selection_bcdedit_bootstatus:
    Image|endswith: \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - bootstatuspolicy
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Backup administrators retiring old backup catalogs with wbadmin
- Imaging or deployment tooling that changes boot recovery settings during provisioning
level: high
id: bdd87ceb-b707-52ce-9219-170bec5ee64d
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/experts-reveal-insights-cyber-crime-ecosystem
```

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

Source reporting: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/experts-reveal-insights-cyber-crime-ecosystem

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