Vexy Ransomware targets Libreria Santa Fe

7 September 2026 elevated threat retail

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Vexy ransomware operators claim compromise of Argentine bookstore chain with 571 user credentials exposed.

Ransomware.live reports that Libreria Santa Fe A P S SRL, an Argentine bookstore chain, has been targeted by Vexy ransomware operators. The compromise resulted in exposure of 571 user credentials and revealed an external attack surface of 15 accessible systems. The victim organization's DNS records were enumerated by attackers as part of reconnaissance. No employee credentials were directly compromised, but the large number of exposed user accounts suggests attackers gained access to customer or employee credential databases. This appears to be an active ransomware campaign where operators have publicly listed the victim, indicating either payment demands or data extortion threats. The attack demonstrates typical ransomware tradecraft: initial reconnaissance via DNS enumeration, lateral movement to harvest credentials, and public listing to apply pressure for payment.

Mentioned in this report

Threat actors Vexy

Malware Vexy

Detection guidance

Domain Account Enumeration via Net Commands

ATT&CK T1087.002

Detects net.exe/net1.exe enumerating domain users or privileged domain groups, a common precursor to credential harvesting and lateral movement in ransomware intrusions. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Domain Account Enumeration via Net Commands
id: e3a6bb3b-d64f-5883-bcda-782ae7fb5171
status: experimental
description: Detects net.exe or net1.exe listing domain users or privileged domain
  groups. Ransomware operators use this for account discovery before credential harvesting
  and lateral movement. Matches the command pattern, not specific account names.
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
    - \net.exe
    - \net1.exe
  selection_user:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - ' user'
    - /domain
  selection_group:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
    - ' group'
    - /domain
  condition: selection_img and (selection_user or selection_group)
falsepositives:
- Domain administrators running ad-hoc account audits from the command line
- Legacy logon scripts or inventory tooling that query domain users with net.exe
level: medium
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.ransomware.live/id/TElCUkVSSUEgU0FOVEEgRkUgQSBQIFMgU1JMQFZleHkgUmFuc29td2FyZQ==

Nslookup DNS Zone Transfer or ANY Record Enumeration

ATT&CK T1590.002

Detects nslookup run with AXFR/IXFR/ANY query types, which is used to enumerate an organisation's DNS records during reconnaissance. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Nslookup DNS Zone Transfer or ANY Record Enumeration
id: cdb7564e-4c63-5c4d-aa4d-75b2b64d5e7c
status: experimental
description: Detects nslookup.exe invoked with zone transfer (AXFR/IXFR) or ANY query
  types, a DNS enumeration technique used for reconnaissance of an organisation's
  DNS records.
tags:
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1590.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \nslookup.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - type=axfr
    - type=ixfr
    - type=any
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators troubleshooting DNS with ANY queries
- Authorised penetration tests or DNS audits
level: low
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.ransomware.live/id/TElCUkVSSUEgU0FOVEEgRkUgQSBQIFMgU1JMQFZleHkgUmFuc29td2FyZQ==

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

Source reporting: https://www.ransomware.live/id/TElCUkVSSUEgU0FOVEEgRkUgQSBQIFMgU1JMQFZleHkgUmFuc29td2FyZQ==

What this brief leaves out

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