Coordinated disinformation network targets Romania elections via social media
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215 coordinated accounts spread false claims of electoral interference across Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok during Romania's 2025 presidential election.
A pro-Russia disinformation network of at least 215 inauthentic accounts operated across Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok from December 2024 through June 2025, targeting Romania's electoral processes. The network initially supported far-right candidate Călin Georgescu, then pivoted to George Simion after Georgescu's barring from the May 2025 election. The campaign spread unfounded accusations that Moldovan President Maia Sandu interfered in Romanian elections, amplified pro-Russian and anti-EU narratives, and criticized Moldova's ruling PAS party.
The operation employed coordinated posting using Romanian and Russian-language hashtags, generating 8,514 posts with at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across platforms. The network utilized stolen or hijacked accounts with existing followers, AI-generated personas and profile pictures, stock footage presented as current events, and AI video-generation tools (D-ID, DreamFace) to create inauthentic content. Multiple accounts infiltrated two public Moldova-focused Facebook groups with 13,300 and 17,100 members respectively. The network also operated ono.news, a fraudulent news channel disseminating the campaign's messaging.
Activity surged during key electoral moments: March during Georgescu's arrest and barring, and May around the second-round vote. The network amplified narratives accusing the EU of election interference, Sandu of dragging Moldova into foreign conflicts, and called for Moldova's independence from EU influence. Meta's public dataset captured only 55 of 121 Facebook accounts, indicating smaller followings were deliberately used to evade detection.
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Source reporting: https://dfrlab.org/2025/08/26/cross-platform-campaign-accuses-moldovas-sandu-of-meddling-in-romanian-elections
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