# Operation Endgame disrupts SocGholish, Amadey, StealC networks

Published: 2026-06-24 · Severity: routine · Sectors: financial-services, healthcare, retail, government-national, technology
Canonical: https://vorant.io/reports/b599566d-685b-5cad-8501-af03dbdd7995/operation-endgame-disrupts-socgholish-amadey-stealc-networks

> Europol-led operation dismantles three major malware-as-a-service platforms; 14,971 infected sites cleaned, 27 million credentials recovered.

Europol and international law enforcement have concluded Operation Endgame, a coordinated takedown targeting the infrastructure behind three malware-as-a-service platforms: SocGholish (FakeUpdates), Amadey, and StealC. Over two weeks of action, law enforcement from nine countries, Microsoft, and private partners seized control of or removed 326 servers and 142 domains, dismantling the distribution networks these tools relied upon. The operation recovered 27 million stolen login credentials and identified over EUR 41 million in criminal cryptocurrency assets.

SocGholish, linked to Russian threat actor Evil Corp, operates as a dropper/loader distributed via fake browser updates on compromised WordPress sites—14,971 WordPress installations were remediated and their owners notified. Amadey, also a dropper/loader, spreads through phishing and serves as initial access for downstream malware deployment. StealC is a password and data stealer with dropper capabilities, used to exfiltrate credentials for fraud and data trading. Together, Amadey and StealC were linked to over 140,000 infected computers in May 2026 alone, demonstrating the scale of their criminal use.

Defenders should prioritize WordPress security: update platforms immediately, enforce multi-factor authentication, remove unauthorized accounts, and change compromised credentials. Users should avoid pop-up update prompts and only trust updates from official sources. The operation marks a strategic shift toward targeting entire malware supply chains rather than individual variants, increasing operational friction for cybercriminals and improving defensive coordination across sectors.

## Mentioned in this report

- Threat actors: Indrik Spider
- Malware: Amadey, FAKEUPDATES, SocGholish, Stealc
- Campaigns: Operation Endgame

## Detection guidance (public sample)

### Script Host Executing Fake Browser Update JavaScript From Downloads

ATT&CK: T1204.001

wscript/cscript running a .js file with an update-themed name from a user Downloads or temp path, matching SocGholish fake browser update lures. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: Script Host Executing Fake Browser Update JavaScript From Downloads
description: Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a JavaScript file with an
  update-themed name from a user Downloads or temp location. This is the typical SocGholish
  (FakeUpdates) pattern after a user is lured by a fake browser update prompt on a
  compromised website. Matches on the behaviour, not a specific file name.
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.t1036.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
    - \wscript.exe
    - \cscript.exe
  selection_ext:
    CommandLine|contains: .js
  selection_name:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - update
    - upgrade
    - chrome
    - firefox
    - edge
  selection_path:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Downloads\
    - \AppData\Local\Temp\
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Developers or admins manually running locally downloaded update or build JavaScript
  files through Windows Script Host
- Software packaging tests that execute vendor update scripts from Downloads
level: medium
id: 1982f680-b66f-5d45-8bc7-e66a4d07e7ac
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/global-cyber-strike-disrupts-socgholish-amadey-and-stealc-malware-networks
```

### Script Host Process Creating Run Key Persistence

ATT&CK: T1547.001

wscript, cscript or mshta writing a Run/RunOnce autostart registry value, a common dropper/loader persistence step (SocGholish, Amadey). Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: Script Host Process Creating Run Key Persistence
description: Detects script host processes (wscript, cscript, mshta) setting a value
  under the CurrentVersion Run or RunOnce keys. Loader and dropper malware such as
  SocGholish and Amadey commonly establish autostart persistence this way after initial
  execution.
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
  category: registry_set
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
    - \wscript.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \mshta.exe
    TargetObject|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run\
    - \CurrentVersion\RunOnce\
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy login scripts or admin VBScript/JScript that register per-user autostart
  entries
- Older installers implemented as script host launched setup routines
level: medium
id: c5000d02-95f6-51b1-af5c-0a761dbc524e
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/global-cyber-strike-disrupts-socgholish-amadey-and-stealc-malware-networks
```

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

Source reporting: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/global-cyber-strike-disrupts-socgholish-amadey-and-stealc-malware-networks

---

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