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Bulletproof Host Gerber EDV Tied to Adwind Botnets

Published Vorant ratingroutine threat

Vorant's rating weighs the evidence in the report: confirmed exploitation, victims claimed, CVSS and EPSS, and how many sources agree. It rates the report, not your assets.

Researcher traces thousands of Adwind/Qrypter RAT C2 servers to a fake Swiss company, Gerber EDV-Dienstleistungen, sharing infrastructure with the AnMaXX bulletproof hosting network.

Sourceabuse.ch — open the original

What to check

Applies to
Whether this concerns you is not assessed; the names the report mentions are listed below.

Abuse.ch researchers tracked nearly 10,000 Adwind (jRAT/JSocket) samples calling back to over 2,800 distinct C&C servers over a six-month period, with most tied to the Qrypter Malware-as-a-Service platform hosted on Tor. Investigation into the hosting infrastructure led to two networks, Gerber EDV-Dienstleistungen (gerber-edv.net) and AnMaXX (anmaxx.net), which share the same IP address and mail server, along with a third domain, rivavpn.com. Both networks advertise themselves as "non-logging VPN" services in RIPE records but have no functioning website.

A physical visit to Gerber's registered Bern office address found no such company present, and no matching entity exists in Switzerland's official business registry, confirming the registration details are fabricated. The analyst concludes Gerber EDV and AnMaXX are operated by the same actors and exist solely to provide bulletproof hosting for Adwind/Qrypter as well as other RAT families including NanoCore and RemcosRAT. RIPE was notified of the fraudulent registration data, though the organization does not verify submitted WHOIS information, allowing such abuse to persist.

The report includes an extensive list of IP netranges tied to Gerber EDV, AnMaXX, and rivavpn.com, plus additional netranges from other providers (including Swiftway, Host1Plus, GigeNET, and others) observed hosting large volumes of Adwind C2 infrastructure, recommending network defenders block these ranges at the perimeter.

Mentioned in this report

Malware AdWindNanoCoreQrypterRemcos

Detection guidance

Java Process Executing Suspicious Command-Line Arguments Consistent with jRAT

ATT&CK T1059.001 · status experimental · needs windows process_creation logs · generated from the report, not run against telemetry

A behavioural hunt for the technique in general.

Detects java.exe spawning with command-line arguments typical of Adwind/jRAT execution: classpath references to jar files in temp directories, main class invocation patterns, or encoded/obfuscated payloads. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Java Process Executing Suspicious Command-Line Arguments Consistent with jRAT
description: Detects java.exe spawning with suspicious command-line patterns associated
  with Adwind/jRAT botnets. Targets java classpath invocation of jar files from temp/user
  directories and typical obfuscated main class patterns, without matching specific
  campaign identifiers.
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_java_temp:
    Image|endswith: \java.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - '-cp '
    - '-classpath '
    CommandLine|re: (\\AppData\\|\\Temp\\|\\ProgramData\\).*\.jar
  selection_java_encoding:
    Image|endswith: \java.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - sun.misc.Unsafe
    - -Xmx
  filter_legitimate_java:
    ParentImage|endswith:
    - \javaw.exe
    - \javapackager.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - maven
    - gradle
    - tomcat
  condition: (selection_java_temp or selection_java_encoding) and not filter_legitimate_java
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Java applications launched from temp directories during installation
  or update
- Development tools (Maven, Gradle) invoking Java with classpath arguments
level: medium
id: 0b79c867-39ff-57af-8fd4-e5cca1810c96
status: experimental
author: Vorant

Executable or Archive Delivery via Email Client Process Creation

ATT&CK T1566.001 · status experimental · needs windows process_creation logs · generated from the report, not run against telemetry

A behavioural hunt for the technique in general.

Detects email client processes (Outlook, Thunderbird) spawning child processes that extract, decompress, or execute files—typical of phishing attachment delivery leading to jRAT/Adwind infection. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Executable or Archive Delivery via Email Client Process Creation
description: Detects email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird, etc.) spawning extraction
  or execution processes (7zip, WinRAR, cmd, powershell, rundll32) immediately after
  attachment interaction. Targets the parent/child process relationship typical of
  phishing payloads triggering malware installation.
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_email_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
    - \OUTLOOK.EXE
    - \thunderbird.exe
  selection_extraction:
    Image|endswith:
    - \7z.exe
    - \7zG.exe
    - \WinRAR.exe
    - \Rar.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \msiexec.exe
  filter_outlook_plugins:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - outlook.exe
    - -embedding
  condition: selection_email_parent and selection_extraction and not filter_outlook_plugins
falsepositives:
- Corporate email security add-ins that scan or decompress attachments
- Legitimate plugins or extensions for email clients that unpack content
level: high
id: 9bce7395-0a28-5aee-8092-9d69e92fa276
status: experimental
author: Vorant

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

Source reporting: https://abuse.ch/blog/anmaxx-gerber-edv-and-the-qrypter-connection

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