# Information manipulation during elections in four post-Soviet states

Published: 2026-03-31 · Severity: routine · Sectors: government-national, media
Canonical: https://vorant.io/reports/62d73f11-b588-5777-a368-5212bb621297/information-manipulation-during-elections-in-four-post-soviet-states

> Foreign and domestic actors exploit information environments across Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to influence electoral discourse via coordinated narratives and platform manipulation.

This analysis from the DFRLab examines foreign and domestic information manipulation campaigns during recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The report documents how Russian and other foreign influence operations intertwine with domestic actors to shape electoral narratives, exploiting unresolved territorial conflicts, anti-Western messaging, and platform-specific vulnerabilities. The campaigns rely on narrative laundering—foreign entities seed narratives that domestic actors then localize and amplify, creating the appearance of domestic origin and complicating attribution.

The report maps platform-specific influence tactics across the four countries. In Georgia, Facebook served as the primary vector for coordinated inauthentic behavior and advertising; foreign actors exploited Meta's 2025 factchecking policy shift to undermine independent researchers. In Moldova, influence operations extended across TikTok, X, Facebook, and Telegram despite local authority efforts to restrict them. Armenia saw Telegram as the primary platform for targeting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, alongside inauthentic news websites. Azerbaijan used X for state-aligned operations targeting international audiences, with domestic media amplifying those narratives abroad.

The research identifies three key dimensions: anti-Western narrative strategies used to delegitimize opposition and justify restrictions; exploitation of unresolved territorial conflicts (Russian-occupied regions in Georgia, Transnistria and Gagauzia in Moldova, Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh) as narrative leverage; and the ecosystems of digital platforms that enabled cross-national influence reach. A leaked Russian presidential office document reinforces the strategic intent, detailing long-term influence-building through diaspora engagement, cultural ties, and religious institutions across the region.

## Mentioned in this report

- Threat actors: Russia-nexus activity (unattributed)

Source reporting: https://dfrlab.org/2026/03/31/foreign-and-domestic-information-manipulation-report

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