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Macfinger ClickFix campaign targets macOS with AMOS variant

routine threat

A ClickFix social-engineering campaign injects fake bot-verification pages into legitimate sites to trick macOS users into running a shell script that deploys an AMOS Stealer variant.

SANS ISC researcher Bradley Duncan documented a ClickFix campaign, dubbed "Macfinger," that compromises legitimate websites with injected JavaScript to display a fake bot-protection/verification page. The page instructs macOS victims to copy and run a command (the classic ClickFix technique), which downloads a Bash shell script from 45.150.33[.]128. That script retrieves architecture-specific Mach-O payloads (arm64 and x86_64) identified by the reporting community as a variant of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), though Duncan notes the indicators differ from AMOS activity he has previously tracked, suggesting a distinct build or fork.

Once executed, the malware beacons to a C2 server at 95.163.153[.]80 over TCP port 8133, sending frequent telemetry (/api/t), harvesting and exfiltrating credentials (/api/credentials), and supporting remote shell access (/api/shell/agent). The injected script and fake verification page also send tracking POST requests to the attacker-controlled domain velvet-otter-glagceis[.]life even before the victim executes anything, suggesting fingerprinting of visitors. The campaign appears to specifically target macOS hosts and was independently reported by the Ransom-ISAC Blog earlier in the month, though it lacked a public name until now.

Defenders should treat any ClickFix-style "verification" prompt asking users to paste and execute a terminal command as malicious, particularly on macOS endpoints. Network defenders should monitor for connections to the listed domain/IPs and unusual outbound traffic to non-standard high ports (8133) carrying credential-like POST data. Microsoft's ClickFix mitigation guidance is referenced for broader protection strategies.

Mentioned in this report

Malware Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS variant)
Campaigns Macfinger ClickFix

Detection guidance

Bash Script Execution from Suspicious Download Sources

ATT&CK T1204.004

Detects execution of Bash scripts downloaded from external sources via curl/wget, typical of ClickFix campaigns downloading malicious payloads. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Bash Script Execution from Suspicious Download Sources
description: Detects bash or sh processes executing remotely fetched scripts via curl/wget
  redirection or piping - characteristic of ClickFix malware delivery where victims
  copy-paste a command that downloads and executes a shell script. This rule targets
  the parent/child pattern and pipe-to-shell syntax, not specific URLs.
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection_bash_pipe:
    Image|endswith:
    - /bin/bash
    - /bin/sh
    ParentCommandLine|contains:
    - '| bash'
    - '| sh'
    - '| /bin/bash'
    - '| /bin/sh'
  selection_curl_wget:
    Image|endswith:
    - /usr/bin/curl
    - /usr/bin/wget
    CommandLine|contains:
    - -o /tmp/
    - -o /var/tmp/
    - '| bash'
    - '| sh'
  filter_legitimate_admin:
    User|startswith:
    - _
    - root
  condition: (selection_bash_pipe or selection_curl_wget) and not filter_legitimate_admin
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software installation scripts from trusted sources
- System administration tools downloading and executing approved scripts
level: high
id: efb0b14e-1c84-5295-8faf-9b5c2b11af3e
status: experimental
author: Vorant

Process Execution Harvesting System and Credential Information

ATT&CK T1082

Detects process execution chains collecting system architecture, user info, and credential access on macOS - AMOS stealer telemetry behaviour. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Process Execution Harvesting System and Credential Information
description: Detects suspicious combinations of system information discovery (uname,
  system_profiler, arch) and credential extraction (security find-generic-password,
  launchctl) executed in sequence - characteristic of AMOS stealer and similar credential
  harvesters that enumerate the system before exfiltration.
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1555
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection_arch_enum:
    Image|endswith:
    - /usr/bin/uname
    - /usr/sbin/system_profiler
    - /usr/bin/arch
  selection_cred_extract:
    Image|endswith:
    - /usr/bin/security
    CommandLine|contains:
    - find-generic-password
    - find-internet-password
  selection_launch_enum:
    Image|endswith: /bin/launchctl
    CommandLine|contains:
    - list
    - getenv
  filter_admin_context:
    User|startswith:
    - _
    - root
  condition: (selection_arch_enum or selection_cred_extract or selection_launch_enum)
    and not filter_admin_context
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administration tools performing inventory or compliance checks
- Educational software or security research tools
level: medium
id: 4cfb18a7-3b47-503d-8335-dbdfb51d61a9
status: experimental
author: Vorant

Outbound Connection to Non-Standard High Port with POST Data

ATT&CK T1071.001

Detects outbound TCP connections to high ports (8000+) carrying POST requests and credential-like data patterns - C2 beaconing behaviour. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

title: Outbound Connection to Non-Standard High Port with POST Data
description: Detects suspicious outbound TCP connections to non-standard high ports
  (typically 8000+) from user processes, characteristic of malware C2 communication
  beaconing and data exfiltration. Generalises on the port range and POST pattern,
  not specific attacker infrastructure.
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: macos
detection:
  selection:
    DestinationPort|gte: 8000
    DestinationPort|lt: 65535
    Protocol: tcp
    User|startswith:
    - /Users/
  filter_known_services:
    Image|endswith:
    - /Applications/Slack.app/Contents/MacOS/Slack
    - /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord
    - /Applications/Spotify.app/Contents/MacOS/Spotify
    - /opt/homebrew/bin/node
  condition: selection and not filter_known_services
falsepositives:
- Development environments and local testing on high ports
- Cloud synchronization and VPN client software using non-standard ports
level: medium
id: cc012969-82dd-5273-ab4d-5053833929ea
status: experimental
author: Vorant

3 more detection artefacts for this report (IOC-atomic rules, Splunk/KQL/Elastic conversions, YARA, Suricata) are available to subscribers.

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

Source reporting: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/33360

This is the public brief

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