# BeagleBoyz targets banks with FASTCash ATM theft malware

Published: 2025-07-14 · Severity: routine · Sectors: financial-services
Canonical: https://vorant.io/reports/421437c2-6fc4-5d40-bd8d-7a867cdd547e/beagleboyz-targets-banks-with-fastcash-atm-theft-malware

> North Korean government hacking team BeagleBoyz uses custom malware to compromise financial institutions and orchestrate ATM cash-outs and SWIFT fraud.

The U.S. Government, working through CISA, Treasury, FBI, and USCYBERCOM, has attributed a coordinated campaign of bank robberies to North Korea's BeagleBoyz—a subset of HIDDEN COBRA activity that overlaps with groups tracked as Lazarus, APT38, Bluenoroff, and Stardust Chollima. Since at least 2015, the BeagleBoyz have targeted financial institutions in 38+ countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, attempting to steal nearly $2 billion through automated ATM cash-outs (FASTCash), fraudulent SWIFT transfers, and cryptocurrency theft. The group employs a multi-stage attack chain: initial access via spearphishing and watering holes, lateral movement to reach SWIFT terminals and payment-switch servers, credential harvesting via keyloggers (ECCENTRICBANDWAGON), and cash-out execution using custom RATs (CROWDEDFLOUNDER, HOPLIGHT) and network tunneling proxies (VIVACIOUSGIFT, ELECTRICFISH). The threat is operational as well as financial—the BeagleBoyz deploy destructive wiper malware and anti-forensic tools that have rendered ATM networks inoperable for weeks and crashed thousands of systems to cover their tracks. UN experts assess the proceeds fund North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of Security Council resolutions.

## Mentioned in this report

- Threat actors: APT38

## Detection guidance (public sample)

### HTML Help Executable Spawning Script or Command Interpreter

ATT&CK: T1218.001

hh.exe (compiled HTML help) spawning a shell, script host or LOLBin, which indicates a weaponised CHM delivered by spearphishing. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: HTML Help Executable Spawning Script or Command Interpreter
description: Detects hh.exe spawning cmd, PowerShell, script hosts or common proxy-execution
  binaries. This is a typical result of opening a malicious CHM attachment from a
  spearphishing or watering-hole lure. Generalises on the parent/child relation, not
  on any specific file name.
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.execution
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1204
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: \hh.exe
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \pwsh.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \mshta.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    - \certutil.exe
    - \bitsadmin.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy application help files that launch a command shell or rundll32 from a help
  topic
level: high
id: 47b76630-0221-537f-9508-a18805a669d0
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-239a
```

### HTML Help Opening CHM From User-Writable Path or Remote URL

ATT&CK: T1218.001

hh.exe opening a .chm file from temp, user profile, downloads, public folders or a remote HTTP location, typical of CHM-based phishing payloads. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: HTML Help Opening CHM From User-Writable Path or Remote URL
description: Detects hh.exe launched with a .chm argument located in user-writable
  directories or fetched over HTTP(S). Weaponised CHM files are a common spearphishing
  and drive-by delivery method for loaders and RATs.
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: \hh.exe
  selection_chm:
    CommandLine|contains: .chm
  selection_loc:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \AppData\
    - \Temp\
    - \Users\Public\
    - \Downloads\
    - http://
    - https://
  condition: selection_img and selection_chm and selection_loc
falsepositives:
- Users opening vendor help files saved in the Downloads folder
- Software installers extracting and showing a CHM from a temp directory
level: medium
id: 6a5ffe07-ed0b-5968-82e0-ee2c2b9b29bf
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-239a
```

### Office Application Spawning Script Interpreter or Download LOLBin

ATT&CK: T1566.001

Word, Excel or PowerPoint spawning cmd, PowerShell, WScript, CScript or mshta, as seen after a spearphishing attachment is opened. Auto-generated starting point — validate and tune in your environment before deploying. IOC matches can false-positive on shared infrastructure and decay as adversary infrastructure rotates.

```yaml
title: Office Application Spawning Script Interpreter or Download LOLBin
description: Detects Microsoft Office processes spawning command or script interpreters,
  or download binaries. This is typical of a spearphishing attachment executing a
  macro or exploit to deliver a RAT. Generalises on the parent/child relation.
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
    - \WINWORD.EXE
    - \EXCEL.EXE
    - \POWERPNT.EXE
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \pwsh.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \mshta.exe
    - \certutil.exe
    - \bitsadmin.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Finance or reporting macros that legitimately call cmd.exe or PowerShell
- Office add-ins that run helper scripts during installation
level: high
id: 425c7616-2cd3-5e77-a7f4-a045f883f515
status: experimental
author: Vorant
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-239a
```

Behavioural rules are generated from public reporting — validate in your environment before deploying.

1 more detection for this report is in the app: the rules that match its indicators, the Sigma rules already converted to Splunk SPL, to Elastic where their fields map onto Elastic's integrations and to Microsoft Defender XDR KQL wherever Defender records the activity, and the YARA and Suricata. A new account gets three days of them free.

Source reporting: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-239a

---

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