FrodoBots EarthRover Mini+ had fleet-wide root RCE
CERT/CC details six firmware flaws in FrodoBots EarthRover Mini+ robots enabling fleet-wide root RCE via hard-coded MQTT credentials; vendor has patched most issues.
Sourcekb.cert.org — open the original
What to check
- Applies to
- The 6 CVEs named below. Whether you run an affected version is not assessed: check the versions the source lists.
- Exploitation
- No exploitation in the wild and no public exploit is recorded for the CVEs named.
CERT/CC published Vulnerability Note VU#188754 describing six vulnerabilities in the FrodoBots EarthRover Mini+ firmware (v6.2.4_6.2.5_0.614.0), a compact internet-connected robot with camera, microphone, and motor controllers used in educational and consumer settings. The most severe issues (CVE-2026-121685 and CVE-2026-121686) involved hard-coded, fleet-wide credentials (Agora token service, AWS IAM, AWS IoT MQTT, and a Slack webhook) embedded in the firmware binary, combined with an MQTT handler that executed arbitrary shell commands as root with no per-device authentication — together allowing unauthenticated remote code execution as root across the entire device fleet. Additional findings (CVE-2026-121687 through CVE-2026-121690) covered unauthenticated local services (HTTP REST API on port 80, ADB root shell on port 5555, SSH on port 22) exposing Wi-Fi credentials and shadow files, an insecure unsigned/unencrypted STM32 motor-controller firmware update mechanism integrity-checked only by an MD5 hash delivered alongside it, and a lack of privilege separation with all processes running as root.
Exploitation could allow an attacker to take live camera/microphone feeds, seize fleet-wide remote root control via MQTT, extract Wi-Fi credentials for lateral network movement, persistently tamper with motor-controller firmware, and misuse exposed Slack/IAM credentials against vendor backend infrastructure. Given the device's mobility and sensors, impacts could extend from digital compromise to physical safety and privacy concerns.
The vendor has remediated the fleet-wide credential exposure and removed the arbitrary MQTT command execution capability, replacing it with a restricted set of predefined management commands. The remaining local-interface and privilege-separation issues (CVE-2026-121687–121690) are asserted by the vendor to require physical proximity and Wi-Fi access-point connection, and are considered mitigated under the current deployment model, though underlying architectural weaknesses (root-run services, unsigned firmware updates) remain. No in-the-wild exploitation is reported; this is a coordinated-disclosure advisory with no confirmed attacker activity. Defenders operating these devices should update to the latest firmware and ensure Wi-Fi access-point passwords are strong and not shared.
Mentioned in this report
Source reporting: https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/188754
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