BaseChat dating app leaks user privacy data
BaseChat Android dating app has three flaws letting attackers intercept sessions, query user data via RevenueCat, and recover supposedly anonymous callers' phone numbers.
Sourcekb.cert.org — open the original
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CERT/CC published a vulnerability note detailing three distinct security weaknesses in BaseChat – Audio Dating App version 9.8.1 for Android, a Flutter-based anonymous voice dating platform. The first issue is a TLS certificate validation failure that accepts any self-signed certificate for backend API connections, allowing a network-positioned attacker to intercept and modify traffic, potentially leading to session credential theft and account takeover. The second issue stems from mapping paid user accounts to a third-party RevenueCat subscriber database using raw phone numbers (MSISDNs) as guessable identifiers, combined with a public RevenueCat API key embedded in the APK; this lets an attacker query arbitrary phone numbers to retrieve user metadata including activity and purchase history. The third issue is that the app writes PII — specifically the remote caller's MSISDN — to unstripped Android system logs during voice calls, exposing phone numbers of users who are meant to remain anonymous, and indicating the backend itself transmits other users' MSISDNs to the client.
These vulnerabilities collectively undermine the core privacy proposition of an anonymous dating platform: a user's identity (phone number), activity, and purchase history can all be exposed to a sufficiently positioned or informed attacker without needing sophisticated tooling. There is no indication of active exploitation in the wild; this is a coordinated disclosure case where CERT/CC was unable to reach the vendor, Mobile Trading GmbH, to remediate the issues.
No patch is currently available. Defenders and users of this specific app have no official mitigation path other than avoiding use of the application for sensitive communications until fixed. Mobile security teams evaluating third-party apps in their environment should treat TLS certificate pinning failures, exposed third-party SDK API keys, and PII logging as a general class of risk to flag during mobile app vetting.
Source reporting: https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/124705
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